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FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION*
G. Merle Bergmant

F OR

some time I have been reading and listening to criticisms directed toward decisions which the Supreme Court has rendered
in cases involving federal question jurisdiction. The general 'tenor of
this criticism is that these decisions demonstrate a surprising lack of
uniformity and conscious purpose.1 Writers profess to search in vain
for sound logic in the Court's opinions. They point up instead the
anomaly which is reflected when cases involving a substantial federal
issue are tried in state courts,2 while those in which no real federal
issue is involved are nevertheless accepted for trial in the federal
courts.8 This result, however, cannot be regarded as· happenstance.
The Court must be as fully aware of the result as the rest of the legal
community. That it persists in its interpretation is evidence that it believes its decisions fully comprehend the Constitutional and Congressional policies underlying the federal question. If that be so, the policy
behind this. type of jurisdiction. cannot be to insure an initial trial in the
federal courts for every controversy involving a federal question, as
some have apparently thought. The real policy or policies behind the
decisions relating to federal question jurisdiction can be ascertained
only with the help of history. The legal analyst too often forgets that
his logic must be applied in context. Whether or not the decisions of
the Supreme Court follow a pattern which has elements both of reason
and of sound policy. depends upon the historical ingredients. It seems
useless to criticise decisions for their lack of reason without :first estab-

* Walter Vincent Schaefer, Professor of Law at Northwestern University and
distinguish,ed scholar of code pleading, although not necessarily in agreement with the
conclusions of this work, has contributed generously to its development through his
able criticism and advice. The author acknowledges his indebtedness for this friendly
assistance.
Associate of the Research Committee on International Federation, the University
of Oklahoma. Author of "The Federal Power to Tax and to Spend," 3 1 MINN. L.
REv. 328 (1947).
1 In particular I have in mind the scholarly work by Messrs. Chadbourn and
Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 639
(1942); two works by Forrester, "The Nature of a 'Federal Question,'" 16 TULANE
L. REv. 362 (1942); "Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5," 18 TULANE L.
REv. 263 (1943); and a comment, 40 ILL. L. REv. 387 (1945).
2 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley; 2II U.S. 149, 29 S. Ct. 62 (1908),
discussed, infra, p. 39.
8
The Fair v. Kohler Die and Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 31 S. Ct. 410 (1913),
discussed7 infra, p. 44.
·

t

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. ,._6

lishing the policy criteria by which those decisions are to be judged.
Until we establish the, real meaning of "federal question" and learn:
what prompted its statutory treatment we cannot judge the actions of
the Court when it deals with this matter. In order, therefore, to side
intelligently either with the Court or its critics we must follow the
emergence and development of "federal question" through the historical periods in which it has taken shape.
·

I
THE EARLY PERIOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

The Constitution of the United States defines the limits of federal
judicial power. It declares, inter alia, that "the judicial power shall
extend to,all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution,
the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority...." 4 This is the head-stream from which
flows all the tributary problems involving federal question jurisdiction.
For almost nine decades following the adoption of the Constitution the
Congress had not seen fit to confer upon the federal courts the plenary
jurisdiction which this passage authorized,5 but the problem of when a
case or controversy could properly be said to "arise" under the Constitution or laws of the United States, appeared early enough in our
history to receive the attention of the great John Marshall. It has
ever after borne the impress of his genius, and none of the later developments can be understood properly unless the contribution of the
great Chief Justice is oriented in our thinking precisely as it was conceived-to accord with the grand strategy of the master policy maker.
In Osborn v. Bank of the United States 6 we see the staunch Federalist at his best. Congress had incorporated the Bank of the United
States and had given it the right "to sue and be sued" in the circuit
courts of the United Stat~. Appellants contested the jurisdiction of
the circuit court on the ground that Congress had no power under the
Constitution to give the 'bank the right to sue in the federal courts. The
Chief Justice was determined to uphold this right. To do otherwise
would run counter to his entire philosophy of government. If he ·could
show that a suit involving a federal- corporation of this n~ture was one
"arising'' under a law of the United States he could uphold the right of
4

U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2.
The "Midnight Judges Bill," passed Feb. 13, 1801, 2 Stat. L. 89, and repealed March 8, I 802, 2 Stat. L. 132 may be safely disregarded.
6
22 U.S. 738 (1824).
5
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Congress to confer this jurisdiction on the circuit courts. In order to do
so he had to interpret the Constitutional provision in its broadest sense.
By declaring at this time the very most that could be subsumed under
the language of the Constitutional grant, he could leave to Congress
and the Court the choice in the future of limiting the jurisdiction within those broad confines. 7 •
Any understanding of the ruling in the Osborn case requires an
understanding of the precise meaning which the majority and dissenting opinions attributed to the terms which appear in the Constitutional
grant. When, for example, does a case "arise" under the federal law?
Did the Chief Justice rule that a case so arises as soon as it appears from
the pleading that a federal question may be involved in the trial? 8 Was
Justice Johnson alone in contending that only those federal questions
which do appear in the course of the trial are adequate under the Constitution to bring a case within its terms? u These questions are at the
very heart of our understanding of the problem. Unless we answer
them with great care and discernment no real progress can be made
in its resolution.
Fortunately, Justice Johnson left no room for d9ubt as to his
understanding of the Constitutional passage. As he viewed it, a case
did not "arise" under federal law until an actual dispute arose over
the interpretation or application of a federal law. If the federal law
itself were not the subject of a controversy between the parties he did
not believe that the federal courts were entitled to take jurisdiction
over controversies in a case which involved only questions of state law
or questions of fact. 10 He admitted that it was sometimes possible to
determine from the plaintiff's pleading alone that the dispute between
7 Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNIV.
PA. L. REv. 639 at 649 (1942), express this notion succinctly when they observe that
"in the Osborn case Marshall was construing for the future, and characteristically he
construed broadly in order to allow future change and growth."
8 Forrester, "Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5," 18 TuLANE L. REV.
•
263 at 270 (1943), suggests that this is a fair analysis of the holding by quoting with
approval from Chadbourn and Levin, ibid., where the learned authors set forth this
distinction between "may" and "do.''
9
See note 8, supra.
10 "No one can question, that the court which has jurisdiction of the principal
question, must exercise jurisdiction over every question. [But] ..• until a question involving the construction or administration of the laws of the United States did actually
arise, the casus foederis was not presented, on which the constitution authorized the
government to take to itself the jurisdiction of the cause ••• neither the letter nor the
spirit of the constitution sanctioned the assumption of jurisdiction on the part of the
United States, at any previous stage." Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
737 at 883 (1824).
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the parties must involve a construction of the federal law, but he contended that as a general rule this was not possible until the defendant's
- pleading at the earliest, and more often not
the trial itself.11
Moreover, Justice Johnson believed that a question could not be
"raised" except by the parties themselves. He seemed to argue that
if the parties did not raise the question the' courts could not construe it,
and if the courts did not construe it, there could be no basis upon which
to take jurisdiction. Apparently a party could not· "raise" a question
which'the other party did not dispute.12 The position taken by Justice
Johnson can be summed up briefly. The federal ·courts could take
jurisdiction of all questions involved in a particular case, provided the
principal question was a federal question.13 And fort-here to be a fed-·
era! question the parties had to dispute the meaning of a federal law.
This could not be known until the defendant's pleading or at the trial
itself; it was, therefore, tmpossible, as a I>_ractical matter, for the court
to assume jurisdiction on the b~sis of the plaintiff's complaint alone.
There seems· to be sound logic in the reasoning of the Johnson
opinion. If t_here is no argument over the meaning of the federal law,
why should the courts rule upon that law? And if the courts do not
rule upon the federal law, why should the federal courts have juris- diction -0ver controversies involving state questions? Chief Justice
Marshall, however, had some ready answers for thes.e queries. Words
which meant one thing to the dissenting Justice meant another to him.
However much one might favor the logic of Justice Johnson, the fact
remains that it is the opinion of the Chief Justice which embodies the

until

11 "To me, the question appears susceptible of a very simple solution; that all depends upon the identity of the case supposed; according to which idea, a case may be
such, in its very existence, or may become such,, in its progress ••• [Such would be
the case] in which the pleadings or evidence raised the question on the law or constitu- _
tion of the United States. • . • Where no question is raised, there can be no contrariety
of construction; and what else had the constitution to guard against?" Id. at 887, 888.
12
This is reasonably evidenced by a discussion in which he amplifies his previous
statement that the question could appear either in the pleadings or in the evidence at
the trial: "As to the cases of the first description, ex necessitate rei, the courts of the
United States must be susceptible of original jurisdiction; and as to all other cases, I
should hold them also susceptible of original jurisdiction, if it were practicable, in the
nature of things, to make out the definition of the case, so as to bring it under the
constitution judicially, upon an original suit. But until the plaintiff can control the
defendant in his pleadings,. I see no practical mode of determining when the case does
occur, otherwise than by permitting the cause to advance until the case for which the
constitution provides shall actually arise.•• : It is not, therefore, because Congress may
not'vest an original jurisdiction •.• that I object to this general grant of the right to
sue; but because that the peculiar nature of t4is jurisdiction is such, as to render it impossible to exercise it, in a strictly original form ..•." Id. at 888, 889.
18
See the first sentence, note' 10, supra. .

1 9471

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

21

interpretation accepted by the majority of the Court, and no case has
ever purported to overrule his opinion. If we would understand the
Constitutional bases of the jurisdiction, therefore, we must understand
the opinion of the Chief J usrice and the terminology which it employed.
Four words in particular require our attention before we can proceed with any thorough analysis. These are, "cause," "action," "question," and "controversy." The familiar term "cause of action" means
all things to all people. But to the Chief Justice it had a special
meaning. In most instances he interpreted "action" to mean the action
of the court, rather than the action of the party, although occasionally
he used the word in the latter sense. In the mind of the Chief Justice,
therefore, the word "cause" referred to that which caused the court to
take its "action." And that which causes a court to take action in any law
suit is the claim of the party. When the party sets forth his "claim of
right" the court must act upon it.' The court may reject the claim
outright, or it may hold a- hearing and render a decision, but in either
event it has acted upon the cl~im of the party. It follows from this,
that the word "cause" must have been synonymous in Marshall's mind
with the word "claim." Occasionally he uses the word "cause" to mean
"trial of the claim," but in most instances the word "claim" alone can
be substituted for the word "cause," and the sentence will make good
sense.
The word "question" is similarly related to the action of the court.
It is frequently used in conjunction with the word "controversy," but
must be carefully distinguished, since a question may or may not be
controverted. Every case usually involves a. number of questions which
must be determined before the case can be decided. A "question," for
Marshall, was precisely what the word implies; it was that which the
court had to ask itself before it could sustain or defeat the party's claim.
The "action" of the court, therefore, consisted principally of asking and
deciding certain questions. This was the responsibility of the courts
whether or not the questions were put in issue by the parties. Thus,
Marshall's view differed from Johnson's in that he considered the
court to be just as competent to "raise" a question as were the parties.
It was part of the court's responsibility as well as its prerogative to act
sua sponte in' this respect. For example, when a plaintiff sues on a
.contract the first question the court must ask itself is whether the
plaintiff has a right to sue at. all. It must ask this question even if the
defendant does not contest the plaintiff's right. And it must ask the
question--at least tacitly-even though it has given an affirmative

22
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answer in a thousand cases before. The very act of accepting the case
and going on with the trial is an affirmative answer to this question. In
Marshall's terms, the question is an "ingredient" of the case even
though it is not controverted by the parties or articulated by the court.
In his words, "The right to sue, if decided once, is decided for ever ...
but the question respecting the right • • . belongs to every particular
case. . •.14 The court is never foreclosed from reversing its previous
decisions and denying the right as long as it is not prevented from doing so by law. Marshall, therefore, rejects Johnson's fundamental assumption that a question can be raised only by the parties.
If there is a "controversy" there is, of course, always a question
involved, but it is not necessarily such a question as would entitle the
court to take jurisdiction. It will be remembered that Justice Johnson
had said that if the federal question were a principal question the federal courts could take jurisdiction of the other questions in the case.
But he did not distinguish between those questions which were principal
and those which'were· incidental. The Chief Justice, on the other hand,
was careful to make this distinction. A question was principal only
when the case could be said to turn upon it. A case could be said to
turn upon a question ( for jurisdictional purposes) whenever one of the
possible rulings on that question would sustain or defeat the claim of
right. For example, in a suit to recover damages under federal law, if
the court ruled that the law did not apply, the claim would be defeated. If such a ruling were possible,. therefore, the case would be
said to turn upon that question, even though the court were actually
to decide that the law did apply, and the plaintiff were later to lose his
case on a question of fact. There are many possible questions upon
which a case might turn;- and any one of them is suffident to vest juris::
diction. The fact that the judge actually makes a ruling which permits
the case to proceed to a further question before it is finally decided,
does not transform the original question into an incidental one. It is
sufficient that an alternative ruling would have ended the case at that
point.
Where the question is incidental, however, in the sense that the
case cannot turn upon it, the federal court is not entitled to take jurisdiction. For example, suppose that A is suing B in State Y upon a tort
committed in State X. A claims that the law of State Y should apply.
B claims that it would be ·a denial of full faith and credit under the
Constitution for the court to refuse to apply the law of State X.
Granting, for the sake of the illustration, that there is current validity
14

Id. at 823, 824.
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to the claim, the court must decide whether the full faith and credit
clause applies in this instance. Even though previous cases amply indicate what its decision will be, as long as the possibility remains for it
to reverse itself, it cannot proceed without ruling on this question. The
very act of proceeding one way or another constitutes such a ruling
( assuming--again for the sake of the illustration-that there are no
alternative grounds). But no matter what it decides, the case cannot
turn upon that decision. The court can either decide that the law of
State X applies, or it can decide that the law of State Y applies. These
are the only possibilities open to it. In either event the case must proceed
upon its merits. The decision, without more, can neither defeat the
claim nor grant recovery under it. The ruling, therefore, is incidental
rather than principal, and the question which prompted it is likewise incidental. The fact that it is a question raised by the parties, and the fact
that it is a question which must be decided, are not enough to make it
the kind of question which can vest jurisdiction in the federal courts.
With these distinctions in mind an intelligent appraisal can be
made of certain passages which we find in the opinion of the Chief
Justice. It has seemed wise to group the general propositions to be
found there into four "Rules," which serve as guides in identifying
the kind of federal question which can give jurisdiction of a case to the
federal courts. These four rules are supplemented by a fifth, which
will be considered in the following section. The five rules together
embody the sum total of the propositions which are to this day the
authoritative expression of federal question jurisdiction. The propositions expressed therein have never been overruled in any case, although
they have been modified in practice, and have been copiously misapplied. Our study, therefore, should identify the pertinent modifications of these propositions and suggest instances where they have been
subverted to some other use than that which was originally intended.
Rule I: The Federal Question may appear (a) clirectly as a claitfl,
of right set up in the pleading, or (b) indirectly as an essential ingredient of the claim of right.
''When a bank sues," said the Chief Justice, "the first question
which presents itself, and which lies at the foundation of the cause, is,
has this legal entity a right to sue? ... This depends on a law of the
United States.... The next question is, has this being a right to make
this particular contract? If this question be decided in the negative, the
cause is determined against the plaintiff; and this question, too, depends
entirely on a law of the United States. . . . The question forms an
original ingredient in every cause. Whether it be in fact relied on or

24
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not, in' the defense, it is still a part of the cause, and may be relied on.
The right of the plaintiff to sue ..• must depend on the state of things
when the action is brought. The questions which the case involved,
then, must determine its character, whether those questions be made in
the cause or not." 16
'
This passage tells us, among other things, that the right of the
plaintiff to sue-and presumably to sue in a particular forum---depends
upon the state of things when the action is brought. In other words,
it is the initial pleading and nothing else from which the facts necessary to vest jurisdiction must appear. In the Osborn case this necessarily means the plaintiff's complaint, since that is the initial pleading in
an original suit. But as Justice Johnson pointed out in his dissent, the
defendant's answer had always served this purpose in a removal suit.
The statement of the Chief Justice did not alter this, since the answer
could readily be conceived, along with the petition for removal, as the
original pleading in the federal court, under the existent rules for
pleading a removal case.
,
The passage also tells us that the question which the case involves,
must determine its character, whether those questions be made out as
such, or not. The first part ,of the quotation explains this further.
When a corporate entity, such as the bank, sues, it may claim only the
right to recover on a contract or the right to an injunction as in the
Osborn case. It may not actually allege that it has the right to sue.
But whether it makes this claim or not, and ~hether or not the defendant alleges that the particular corporate entity does not have the right
to sue, the question is an ingre_dient of the claim which is set forth.
Unless it is answered in the affirmative the plaintiff cannot recover on
the cop,tract or be given the equitable relief it seeks. Thus, although a
question does not appear directly as a claim, it appears indirectly as an
ingredient of the claim. In Marshall's opinion this is sufficiep.t, under
the Constitution, to give jurisdiction to the federal courts.16
Rule 2: (a) The federal question must appear from bona fide
facts in the pleading--not from a conclusion of law-to be one which
the courts must necessarily rule upon, and (b) it must appear that of
Ibid.
He says, ''We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power
of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause,
it is in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause••••"
(Italics supplied). Id. at 823. Emphasizing the "claim of, right'' notion over that of
mere "controversy'' the Chief Justice says, in reference to the Constitution, the "words
obviously intended to secure to those who claim rights under the constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United Stat~s, a trial in the federal Courts..•." Id. at 822.
iG
16
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the possible rulings which could be made, one would sustain or defeat
the party's claim without any further proceedings.
Some have understood Marshall to say that the federal question
need not actually be ruled upon by the court, but need appear only as
one which the court may rule upon.11 This is not borne out, however,
by the facts of the Osborn case, or by the words of the Chief Justice.
He relied for his -ruling upon the fact that the courts must determine
whether or not a bank of the United States can sue before the case can
be heard on its merits. There was nothing conjectural about this.18 The
federal question must be ruled upon-tacitly or expressly-but in
order to vest jurisdiction it is sufficient that, one of the possible rulings
be capable of sustaining or defeating the claim at that point in the
proceedings. This is the distinction, which has already been made, between a principal and incidental question. It should be noted_ also that
the Chief Justice required that the facts necessary to support the action
of the court be substantially set forth. 19 In other words, it must not appear simply as a conclusion of law in the party's. pleading that the court
must decide a federal question upon which the case could. turn, but it
must appear rather in a bona fide claim established by sufficient facts.
Rule 3: (a) The appearance of a federal question in the pleading
will vest jurisdiction in the federal court of all other questions in the
case, but (b) initial appearance of the f edera~ question at the trial will
not vest such jurisdiction.
Counsel in the Osborn case contended that even if the federal courts
were entitled to jurisdiction of the federal question, they were not
entitled to jurisdiction of the remaining questions, which were purely
state questions or questions of fact. This proposition v.as rejected by
both the Chief Justice and Justice Johnson.20 The Chief Justice said,
''We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of
17

See note 8, supra; also note 45, infra~
Perhaps the statement which has misled many scholars on this point appears in
the following passage: "A cause may depend on several questions of fact and law.
Some of these may depend on the construction of a law of the United States; others on
principles unconnected with that law. If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction,
that the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one construction of the
constitution or law of the United States, and 'sustained by the opposite construction,
provided the facts necessary to support the action be made out, then all the other questions must be decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction." (Italics
supplied.) Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 738 at 821 (1824). It will
be seen that the conjecrural element is not whether the question will be ruled upon,
but only whether one ruling or another will be made.
19
See the last part of quotation in note 18, supra.
20
See Johnson's remarks, note 10, supra.
18
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the Union is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the
original cause, it is in the power of congress to give the circuit courts
jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law
may be involved in it." 21 This passage implies that the Congress could,
if it so desired, limit jurisdiction of the federal courts to the federal
question alone. But in the absence of such a limitation, all other questions revealed in the claim are within the federal jurisdiction, notwith- _
standing the fact that they depend entirely upon state law or the facts
of the case for their determination. This proposition becomes especially
significant in connection with Rule 5•22 The proposition expressed in
3 (b) is nothing but the corollary of that which is set forth broadly in
Rule I-that jurisdiction must vest at the time of the pleading.
Rule 4: (a) The federal question need not appear as a controversy
in order to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts, and (b) failure to
controvert the federal question in the defendant's pleading' or at the
trial will not oust jurisdiction.
Since the essential elements of this rule have already been discussed, it remains only to relate these propositions, and the opposing
ones of Justice Johnson, to the pertinent passages in the opinions. The
Chief Justice supports his position ( that a case arises under federal law
when there is an inherent federal' question, even though it is not controverted or spelled out in the trial) by observing that "the clause
in the patent law; authorizing suits in the circuit courts, stands ... on
the same principle. Such a suit is a rase arising under a law of the
United States. Yet the defendant may not, at the trial, question the
validity of the patent, or make any point which requires the construction of an act of congre8$. He may rest his defense exclusively on the
fact, that he h"as not violated the right of the plaintiff. That this fact
beco~es the sole question made in the cause, cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Court, nor establish the position, that the case does not arise
under a law 0f the United States." 23
Justice Johnson does not think the analogy an appropriate one.24
21
(Italics supplied.) Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 737 at 823
(1824):
22
See Rule 5, p. 32, infra.
28
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 737 at 826 (1824).
2
~ "As to the instance of the action given under the patent law, it has been before remarked, that so entirely is its existence blended with an act of Congress, that to
prosecute it, it is indispensable, that the act should be set forth as the ground of action.
I rather think it is an unfortunate quotation, since it presents a happy illustration of
what we are to understand by those cases arising under a law of congress, which in their
nature admit of an exercise of original jurisdiction. The plaintiff must [to?] recover,
must count upon the act of congress; the constitutional characteristic appears on the
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But it will not serve our discussion to side with either of the learned
jurists; it is too late to consider the merits of their respective positions.
It is sufficiezit for our purpose to observe that under the ruling of the
Court a federal question can appear in a case without being the subject
of a controversy, and it can and must appear in the pleading of the
party when he sets forth his claim of right.

II
THE RECONSTRUCTION PERIOD AND AcT oF

1875

It was not until 1875 that Congress conferred original jurisdiction
upon the federal courts in federal question cases. It would seem that
the Congress of that day had some special reason for this, which was
not apparent in the earlier period. As one work aptly puts it, "the
elected representatives of the people were to postpone the exercise by
Congress of the full extent of its judicial powers ... until such time as
the exigencies of a given situation clearly demonstrated the necessity
therefor." 25
•
It has been suggested that the change which was brought a:bout in
1875 was engineered by means of "sneak legislation,"• designed to expand what was initially a mere removal statute.26 And it has further
been suggested that the purpose of the Congress is not to be discovered in the Congressional Record of that period.21 But it seems unlikely that Congress had no better reason for its action at this time than
a sudden desire to extend the judicial power to the limit of the Constitutional grant. It is true that the language in the Congressional
Record would seem to substantiate such a view, since the only explanation offered by the proponents of the measure reveals no other purpose.28 But if we accept the thesis that this was a "sneak" measure, it
follows that the proponents of the measure would avoid a detailed
record, before the defendant is called to answer; and the repeal of the statute before
judgment, puts an end to his right altogether. Various such cases may be cited. But
how the act of congress is to be introduced into an action of trespass, ejectment or
slander, before the defendant is called to plead, I cannodmagine." Id. at 902, 903.
25 Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNiv.
PA. L. REv. 639 at 642 (1942). The authors go on to say, "One would expect, then,
to find such exigencies existing in 1875 when original jurisdiction over federal questions {as distinguished from that conferred by removal statutes) was first given the
federal judiciary.by the Act of March 3d." But they then say, "However, a study of
the history of the bill as revealed by the Congressional Record yields no reason for its
enactment at that time.•••"
28 Id. at 643. •
27 See note 25, supra.
18 "The Act of 1789 did not confer the whole power which the Constitution
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explanation on the floor of Congress. Open debate might reveal more
urgent reasons against the measure than those favoring it. Such reasons are not difficult to imagine. For many years the dockets of the
federal courts had been increasingly burdened by the extension of
federal jurisdiction. Such measures, it is true, had carried in the face
of heated opposition, but only because Congress had been convinced
that the necessity of evading local prejudice was greater than the necessity of relieving the feder~l courts of t~eir heavy burden.29 There
seems little doubt that this same fear of local prejudice motivated the
proponents of the change in 1875. The late war had fanned the flames
of sectional distrust so that considerations of this nature were greater
thin at any other time in the nation's history. It is not surprising,
therefore, that legislation was introduced to meet the threat of local
bias. For some, at least, the exigencies of the moment "clearly demonstrated the necessity therefor." But certainly it would have been unwise
to defend such an argument at a time when the southern states were being welcomed back into the national fold. Opponents would quickly
declaim that this measure demonstrated lack of confidence in the reconstructed states and would tend to split the Union. This, added to the
traditional argument that any increase of federal jurisdiction unduly
burdened the federal courts, might well have defeated the measure.
Wisdom dictated, therefore, that it be introduced as an appendage to
the 'removal bill, and the least said about it the better.
But the very f;ctors which suggested that it would be impolitic
.to advertise the measure, impressed its proponents with the need for
such legislation. It was apparent by 1874, when the measure was first
advanced, that the mood of the country was for a return to normalcy.
The sooner the southern states could take control of their own destiny,
conferred; ..• this bill does ... This bill gives precisely the _power which the Constitution confers-nothing more, nothing less." Statement of Matthew H. Carpenter,
2 CONG. REC. 4986-7 (1874).'
.
29 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME CouRT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 680-68 5
(1937), reviews federal litigation. Stating in the text at 684, 685 that "the United
States Courts soon became overwhelmed with litigation," the author observes in the
footnote that "early- Removal Acts had grown out of fear of prejudice in State Courts
against the National Government. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Act of Feb. 2, 1815,
Act of March 9, 1815, Act of April 27, 1816, growing out of opposition of New
England to the War of 1812; Act of March 2, 1833, growing out of nullification in
South Carolina; Act of July 27, 1866, and Act of March 2, 1867, growing out of
conditions in the Southern States; see also Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875." The
obvious implication is that Congress was strongly influenced by the local prejudice;
no other consideration would have impelled it to increase the burden on the federal
courts at times when they were known to be heavily burdened already.
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the better the nation would like it. Most of these states had already
taken up the reins of government, and it was evident, both from the
actions of the President and from the sentiment of the country, that
most, if not all, of federal control in the southern states would be withdrawn by the end of the Grant Administration a few years hence.
Astute observers undoubtedly wondered what the fate of a plaintiff's
claim in a southern court would be if he were to seek recovery under
some of the reconstruction legislation. Perhaps his plight would be no
more difficult than that of any other plaintiff, but more likely his cause
would be prejudiced, and caution dictated that no chance be taken. In
1824 Chief Justice Marshall had said, "it is not insinuated, that the
judicial power ... must first be exercised in the tribunals of the state;
tribunals over which the government of the Union has no adequate
control, and which may be closed to any claim asserted under a law
of the United States." so While it is true that the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution gave grounds for an argument that this observation of the Chief Justice was no longer valid, the Fourteenth
Amendment was still new and untried, and few were prepared to test,
its strength to the utmost. Its chief use was in the field of civil rights,
and there was already legislation requiring prejudiced cases to be tried
in the federal courts.31 But civil rights constituted only a small part of
potential litigation, and some additional protection was needed for cases
of a different type. At that time no one had heard of the Federal Employers Liability Act and that group of cases which suggest that state
courts may be forced to assume jurisdiction over a federal cause. If ·
such a proposition were to be abstracted from the Fourteenth Amendment no one had yet suggested it, and if it were to be related to the
supremacy clause, the statement of Chief Justice ~arshall was still
considered good law. The situation in I 87 5 provided ample justification for a real fear that state courts m1ght simply refuse to entertain a
suit in which the plaintiff sought recovery under a claim of federal
right. It seemed apparent to many that if the federal laws were not to
lose their vitality the plaintiff must be provided with a forum. Even
if it were conceded that the state courts would accept the plaintiff's case,
so (Italics supplied.) Osborn v. Bank' of the United States, 22 U.S. 737 at 821
( 1824).
31
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided "that the . . . courts of the United
States .•• shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance .•• of
all causes .•• affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or
judicial tribunals of the State or locality where they may be any of the rights secured
to them by the first section of this act...." (Italics supplied,) 14 Stat. L. 27 ( 1866).
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they could, nevertheless, defeat hrs claim. They could decide in his
favor on the federal question but decide against him on a state question,
thus preventing any appeal to the federal courts. Or, having decided
against him on the federal question, they could so shape the record that
the federal court on appeal would be obliged to affirm.82 These may
seem to be exaggerated considerations in this day and age, but there is
little doubt that they were sufficiently real in 1875 to impress some
with the advisability of providing an impartial forum for the consid~ration of those federal question cases which might be subject to bias in the
state courts.88
It would serve no useful purpose to multiply authority on behalf
of this proposition. My object is simply to suggest that the change,
which the act of 1875 introduced, was brought about largely,. if not
entirely, in order to provide an impartial forum for those cases in
which the federal question might be prejudiced in state courts. It
seems to me unlikely that thei;-e was any desire to ·remove those cases
which were assured of impartial treatment. The long liist6ry between
1789 and·1875 proved that when their decisions were not colored by
sectional interests the state courts were fully as competent to handle
federal questions as were any of the federal courts. In fact, the only
excuse for any appeal in such cases was to insure uniformity throughout
,the country.H There was no fear that the decisions of impartial state
>

32

Commenting on coun~el's argument that the federal court is restricted to mere
aj,pellate review of the precise federal question, Chief Justice Marshall observes that in
such a case, "a trial in the federal courts, will be restricted. to the insecure remedy of
an appeal, upon an insulated point, after it ha; receifled that ;hape whick may be
gir1en to it by anotker tribunal, into which he [plaintiff] is forced against his will."
(Italics supplied.) Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. 737 at 822, 823
(1824).
38
Although professing not to see the purpose of the act of 1875, it was only natural that these considerations should find expression in the careful research of Messrs.
Chadbourn and Levi'n. They say, "the fact is, however, that from'the days of the War
of 1812, Congress had extended the removal jurisdiction of the inferio_r Federal courts
whenever sectional opposition to national policy was reflected by the State judiciary.
The removal provision contained in the "Force Bill," passed as an answer to South
Carolina's threats of nullification, was an early example of the willingness of Congress to
exercise the Constitutional power of lower court jurisdiction over federal questions to
meet that challenge of anti-federal philosophy which su~sequently was fought out on
the field of battle. Extension followed extension during the war years and in the early
reconstruction period." Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal
Questions," 90 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 639 at 644 (1942).
84
Cf. the statement of Justice Johnson in Osborn v. Bpnk. of the United States,
22 U.S. 737 at 888 (1824), that "where no question is raised, there can be no contrariety of construction; and wkat else had the comtitutfon to guard against?" (Italics
supplied.)
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courts would reflect unsound judicial treatment. The federal courts
had no monopoly on the general principles of American law. And as
long as the state courts remained unbiased, the record which they sent
to the federal courts on appeal would be ample to present fairly any
problem which arose in the case. On that record the federal courts
could always correct an error of law or make the decision conform to
the national pattern. Moreover, by allowing the state courts to retain
jurisdiction of those federal question cases in which there was no bias,
the burden on the federal courts was correspondingly reduced.
The question of congressional intent in 1875, however, has its
greatest significance for us in section 5 of the act, since it is from this
section that we derive the final rule in our jurisdictional quintet. 85 It
is not surprising that the somewhat yague phraseology of this section
should have occasioned some confusion in its interpretation. Some read
in it a provision that the federal courts must give up valid jurisdiction
if the controversy in the case does not really involve a dispute over the
federal question.86 This notion that the court must be ousted of jurisdiction subsequent to the complaint if it becomes apparent that the federal
question will not be controverted at the trial seems to run directly counter
to the policy underlying Marshall's ruling that jurisdiction may vest notwithstanding that it appears from the complaint that the federal question will never be controverted at the trial. 37 Others interpret section 5
to mean that jurisdiction can never vest if the court, subsequent to the
complaint, determines that the facts alleged therein are not true. 88
115
By the terms of this section the circuit court was obliged to dismiss a case or
remand it to the state court if "it shall appear to the satisfaction of the said circuit court,
at any time' after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does
not ,really a,:id substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said circuit court, or that the parties to said suit have been improperly or
collusively made or joined, either as plaintiff's or defendants, for the purpose of creating
a case cognizable or removable under this act..•." 18 Stat. L. 470 at 472, § 5 (1875),
28 U.S.C. (1940) § So.
,
86
" • • • the court must refuse to continue with the case if in fact the controversy
actually presented for determination does not 'really and substantially' turn upon a
matter essentially federal in nature. The traditional requirement that jurisdiction must
exist at the beginning of the suit was not violated. There was only involved the refusal to exercise a power admittedly existent." Chadbourn and Levin, "Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions," 90 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 639 at 649, 650 (1942).
87
See Rule 3, p. 25, supra. ,
88
" • • • the purpose of Section 5 is to permit the court to go beyond the pleadings of the parties and on its own motion to investigate the facts. And eoen though it
may have as!umed jurisdiction on the allegations of the parties, if the facts found by the
court do not sustain the allegations the court has no jurisdiction and never had any and
must dismiss the case ••• In applying Section 5 the court determines if there is or ever
was 'original federal jurisdiction.' It is not determining if it 'must refuse to continue'
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This proposition seems to violate Marshall's ruling that jurisdiction
vests at the time of the complaint.39 If the_Constitution of the United
States, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, authorizes the federal
courts to assume jurisdiction over a case at the time of the complaint,
how can the Congress declare that such jurisdiction has never vested?
Obviously the Congress cannot; and as a matter of fact, it did not.
Section 5 purports to guide the trial court, and it is axiomatic that the
trial court must have decided that there was federal jurisdiction in
order for it to proceed to the trial stage. If, at that time, it reconsiders
the question of jurisdiction it is not concerned with the past, but only
with the present. It is only at the appeal stage.that the court reviews
the propriety of the vesting of jurisdiction as well as the propriety of its
retention. That there was jurisdiction, i.e., that jurisdiction had previously vested, is not questioned by the trial court, since it proceeded to
trial on that assumption. That there no longer is jurisdiction, i.e., that
jurisdiction has subsequently been ousted, is another question entirely,
which section 5 makes possible. The real significance of section 5,
therefore, is to be found in the additional question which it authorizes.
This proposition may be best translated into the following terms:
Rule 5. Whenever the facts in subsequent pleadings or at the trial
1'f"'veal to the satisfaction of the court that the case does not presently
involve a ruling upon a federal question which could sustain or defeat
a bona fide claim, the federal jurisdiction will be ousted.
Chief Justice Marshall had said that jurisdiction would vest in the
federal courts at the time of the pleading, if it appeared from a bona
fide claim that the court must rule upon a federal question which could
determine the cause at the moment of that ruling. He had nothing to
say about the ousting of that jurisdiction, except to observe that it could
not be brought about by the mere fact that the federal question was not
itself the subject of a controversy. He did not say that the jurisdiction
could not be ousted if the facts necessary to vest it had disappeared
from the case. His failure to make such a ruling opened the way to
many difficulties, and Congress took upon itself the task of closing the
breach. It will be remembered that Marshall considered it sufficient
to vest jurisdictiol}. in the federal courts if the necessary facts appeared
in the original pleading. But what if the party later amended his pleading so that the facts no longer appeared? Unless there were some provision for ousting jurisdiction the case would remain in the federal
even though there is and was original federal jurisdiction." Forrester, "Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5," 18 TULANE L. REv. 263 at 283 (1943).
311 See discussion, p. 24, ~upra.
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courts. A similar result would be reached if the facts appeared in all of
the pleadings but were no longer present at the trial. Such a result
would suggest that the party had not brought his case into the federal
courts in good faith. Marshall had said that it must appear from the
pleading that the party brought his claim in good faith, but nothing he
said would cover the situation where the claim appeared bona fide in
the original pleading and later did not. It is more than likely, of
course, that the courts would construe this as a fraud upon their jurisdiction and oust the case of their own accord, but Congress turned this
likelihood into a certainty by imposing the duty on the court. In so
doing, it did not contradict what Marshall had said; it did not attempt
to redefine "federal question" but merely supplemented the Osborn
ruling by introducing what had been left unsaid. The pointed reference
to the joinder of parties "collusively" made, is a strong indication that
the purpose of section 5 was to prevent the parties from enjoying federal jurisdiction where it had been sought and obtained in bad faith.
A controversy was certainly not "properly within the jurisdiction of
said Circuit Court" when the parties had caused that jurisdiction to
vest, even though the necessary fact situation was not a bona fide element in the case. Under such circumstances it was only proper that
jurisdiction should be ousted. The provision in section 5, therefore,
makes no attempt to alter the meaning of "federal question" as it was
conceived and spelled out by Chief Justice Marshall. It simply gives
the courts a second chance at bat.

III
THE EARLY PERIOD OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Subsequent to the act of I 87 5 the first case to present the problem
of the federal question was Gold-Washing and Water Co. v. Keyes. 40
Chief Justice Waite, who delivered the opinion of the Court, was
called upon to decide whether the jurisdiction had been properly taken,
and if so, whether it had been properly retained. As was noted in connection with Rule 5, these two questions are the opposite sides of the
same coin. The criteria are the same. The only difference is that in the
one instance the necessary facts must appear in the original pleading,
whereas in the other they must appear in the later stages of the case.
The Chief Justice ruled that the jurisdiction had not been properly
taken, and that even if it had been properly taken, it had not been
40

96 U.S. 199 (1877).
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properly retained. His first ruling,. it should be noted, simply reflects
-the propositions expressed above in Rule 2 ( a )-that the claim which
appears in the original pleading must be supported by sufficient facts
· rather than appear as a mere conclusion of law.41 This was Marshall's
rule for the vesting of jurisdiction, and the Chief Justice was observing
it faithfully. 42 Although he might have been content with this ruling,
since the facts of the case were strictly confined to it, he felt obliged to
make some mention of section 5, which would have applied if the Court
had decided that jurisdiction had properly vested, and had then proceeded to review the propriety of retaining the case on· the basis of the
subsequent pleadings or evidence at .the trial.43 He argued simply that
where the controversy which was the subject of the trial did not in, volve a right which was itself dependent upon a_ federal question, the
court had no reason to retain the case.44 This is just another way of
saying that the federal question must be principal, i.e., capable of re41 The Chief Justice said, "It is well settled that in the courts of the United States
the special facts necessary for jurisdiction must in some form appear in the record of
every suit .•• the record in the State Court, which includes the petition for removal,
should ••• show jurisdiction in the court to which it goes. If •.• not .•• the suit
must be remanded. The attempt to transfer this· cause was made under that part of
sect. 2 of the act of l 87 5 which provides for the removal of suits 'arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States.' •.• Upon the pleadings alone, it is
clear the defendants had not brought themselves within the statute.••• The office of
pleading is to state facts, 'not conclusions of law. It is the duty of 'the court to declare
the conclusions and of the parties to state the premises.'' Id. at 201, 202.
42 He concluded, "In this petition the defendants ••• state no facts to show the
right they claim, or to enable the court to see whether it necessarily depends upon the
construction of the statutes.••• In pleading the statute, therefore, the facts must be
stated which call it into operation. The averment that it is in operation will not be
enough; for that is the precise question the court is called upon to determine.'' Id.
at 202, 203.
43 Apparently in reply to counsel, the Chief Justice said, "A cause cannot be removed from a State court simply because, in the progress·of the litigation, it may become
necessary to give a construction to the Constitution or laws of the United States. The
decision of the case must depend µpon that construction. The suit must, in part at least,
arise out 9f a controversy between the parties in regard to the operation and effect of
the Constitution or laws upon the facts involved. That this was the intention of Congress is apparent from sect. 5 of the act of 1875, which requires the Circuit Court
to dismiss the cause, or remand it to the State court, if it shall appear, 'at any time
after such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really or
substantially involve a disput~ or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said
Circuit Court.'' Id. at 203.
' 4 This notion he expresses in the following passage: "Before,_ therefore, a circuit
court can be required to retain a cause under this jurisdiction, it must in some form
appear ••• that the suit is one which 'really and substantially involves a dispute or
controversy' as to a right which depend_s upon the construction or effect of the Constitution, or some law or treaty of the United States.'' (Italics supplied). Id. at 203,

204.
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solving the claim of right one way or the other, rather than incidental.
Nothing could better reflect a faithful adherence to the rules of the
Osborn case, but partly because his critics have misinterpreted the
Osborn opinion,45 and partly because they have misinterpreted the
Keyes opinion,46 Chief Justice Waite has been accused of departing
from the Marshall code. Certainly it is not true that the requirements
of the Osborn case are met by the mere fact that it may become necessary to give a construction to the Constitution or federal laws. The
case must involve such a construction. While it is true that the actual
ruling need not sustain or defeat the claim, the alternative ruling must,
and it is this notion that Chief Justice Waite expresses when he says,
"the decision of the case must depend upon that construction." 47
Conjecture enters a case, according to the Osborn opinion, only when
the court is actually called upon to construe the federal question. At
that point it is uncertain whether the court will follow one construction or another, but that it must follow one or the other is already a
c.ertainty. The mere possibility that a court may be obliged to rule
on a federal question is never sufficient to vest jurisdiction, and it is this
possibility which the Waite critics erroneously insist the Osborn opinion
dignifies. The Keyes opinion, in its turn, has been misconstrued to
mean that the dispute in the case must involve a federal question. But
when the Chief Justice insists that there must be a controversy between the parties as to a right which depends upon a construction of thB
federal law, he is not saying that the federal law must itself be the subject of controversy. The parties may only dispute a question of fact,
whereas the claim of right may be defeated on· a question of law. The
significant requirement reiterated by Chief Justice Waite is simply that
the federal question must be a principal question, whether or not it be
controverted. This is certainly not an unfamiliar notion. ·
In all, the Chief Justice was faithful to the propositions of the
"5 "The ••. words .•. set forth a rule which is much narrower than the rule of
the Osborn case. Under the Osborn case there does not have to be a. 'controversy
between the parties in regard to the operation and effect of the Constitution or laws.'
The mere fact that'••. it may become necessary to give a construction to the Constitution or laws' would seem to meet the broad requirements of the Osborn case." Forrester, "The Nature of a 'Federal Question,'" 16 TULANE L. REv. 362 at 379
(1942). The first sentence of this analysis is, of course, sound; but the concluding
sentence misinterprets the Marshall opinion.
46
"The theory of the Gold-Washing case is that federal jurisdiction never exists
unless there is a real and substantial dispute arising under federal law upon which the
decision in the case depends.••." Forrester, "Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5," 18 TULANE L. REv. 262 at 275 (1943).
47
See quotation, note 43, supra.
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Osborn case, as he himself observed. Marshall had said that certain
facts must appear in the initial pleading to vest jurisdiction. Waite
said that these facts did not appear, and therefore jurisdiction had not
properly vested. Section 5 of the act of I 87 5 provided that jurisdiction
must be ousted if the facts necessary in the original pleading were not
prese1J,t in the subsequent proceedings as well. Waits observed that the
initial pleadings had not contained the requisite facts, and since section
5 would have required jurisdiction to be ousted when those facts no
longer appeared in the case ( even if they ·had originally so appeared),
there could be no basis for retaining the case pending the appearance of.
the kind of federal question (incidental) which would have been insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the first place. Moreover, where jurisdiction has not vested at the time of the original pleading, the appearance of the necessary facts at the trial cannot vest such jurisdiction
(Rule 3b) even though their presence woul~ have justified a retention
of the case had such jurisdiction originally vested. But in any event,
the fact that the court might be obliged at the trial to give a construction to the federal law is insufficient either to vest or to retain jurisdiction. Even if it appears, however, that such a construction niust be
given, it must also appear that the case will turn upon it, since jurisdiction cannot be based upon an indetermin~te contingency; to take. or to
retain jurisdiction the federal question must be principfl.l rather than
incidental. This is a faithful application of the basic tenets which were
developed in the Osborn case.
Two other cases which faithfully observed the ruling in the Osborn
case were Railroad Company v. Mississippi 48 and Metcalf v. Watertown.49 In the Railroad case the question was whether the defendant's
answer could properly introduce the claim upon which federal jurisdiction was based: Marshall had said that this claim must appear in the
original pleading. But there was a long history, as Justice Johnson had
observed, during which the answer in removal cases· had served this
function. It was reasonable, therefore, for the Court to find that the
answer was the original pleading as far ~ the removal p~oceedings
were concerned, and jurisdiction could vest on that basis. In the
Metcalf case the Court distinguished between remo~al and original
cases and held, as Marshall had held, that the necessary facts must appear in the plaintiff's complaint where the suit was originally brought
in the federal courts.
48
49

102 U.S.-135 (1880).
128 U.S. 586, 9 S. Ct. 173 (1888).
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The result in the Railroad case seemed perfectly reasonable at the
time the ruling was made. But the Court soon realized that if it had required the facts to appear in the complaint in removal cases as well
as in the original cases, the federal dockets would be somewhat relieved. At a time when the dockets were being increasingly burdened
this was no small consideration. The Court, of course, could not relieve
the federal dockets at the expense of the policy which Congress had in
mind when it conferred jurisdiction upon the federal courts in -the first
place. But if it could reconcile the policy of Congress with its own
self-interest there would be nothing to stand in the way of such a
salutary result. No such compromise could be worked out, however, if
the real purpose of the act was to insure an initial. federal trial for
every federal question case. But if the purpose were only to insure
that injured parties might bring prejudiced cases into the federal
courts, a solution could be worked out. The presumption is that the
plaintiff is the principal injured party, and although it is conceivable
that prejudice will arise where the federal question is raised in the
defendant's answer, it is much more likely to occur where the plaintiff
seeks affirmative recovery. A convenient distinction, therefore, could
be drawn between a federal claim appearing in the plaintiff's complaint, and one merely-raised by way of defense. Moreover, by permitting the defenda:gt to remove to the federal courts on the basis of
his own claim, the law would confer an advantage upon him which it
denies the plaintiff in a like situation. The plaintiff is entitled to bring
his suit in the federal courts if he fears local bias; but if he believes
that he will be given an impartial hearing in the state court he can
bring his case there. (This choice allowed the plaintiff effectively refutes the notion that Congress wanted every federal question case to be
tried initially in the federal courts.) Should the plaintiff, however,
bring his case in the state court solely to avail himself of some advantage, the defendant can remove to the federal court on the basis of
the plaintiff's complaint, and thereby cancel the unfair advantage
which the plaintiff seeks. Yet under the ruling of the Railroad case the
defendant is allowed a similar advantage. Where a plaintiff brings a
bona fide claim under state law the defendant has only to plead a
defense under federal law to remove the case to the federal courts.
This he might do solely for some advantage to him in the federal
courts-not out of fear of local prejudice-and the plaintiff could .not
prevent it. The fact, then, that defendants are usually not prejudiced
in state courts when they defend on federal grounds,. and that the right
to remove to the federal courts on the basis of the answer greatly bur-
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dens the federal dockets 50 and gives the defendant an unfair advantage,
naturally influenced the thinking of the Court. It soon became apparent
that self-interest, congressional policy, and fair-play favored a rule
restricting the right of the defendant to remove to the federal courts.
The sole basis would have to be the claim in the plaintiff's complaint.
The act of March 3, 1887, amended in 1888, provided a convenient occasion for the Court to correct its previous stand. This act
provided that only the defendant could remove to the federal courts,
and then only those cases "of which the circuit courts of the United
States are given original jurisdiction in the preceding section."u It was
this sentence which gave the Court the opportunity to change the ruling
which it had laid down in the Railroad case only seven years before.
In Tennessee v. Union and Planters' Bank,52 the majority held that
since the claim of right had to appear in the plaintiff's complaint in
cases originally brought in the federal courts, the new act would restrict removal to the same kind of case. Justice Harlan, who had delivered the opinion in the Metcalf case, dissented on the ground that
the new enactment limited the defendant's right to remove to the new
jurisdictional amount which was established in the "preceding Section"
and did not refer to the procedural means by which the claim was determined. Apparently Justice Harlan was not concerned with such
practical considerations as the relief of the federal dockets. But the
failure of Congress to clarify, its position following this case would
seem to support the majority interpretation of the Congressional intent,
both as to the act of 1875 and that of 1887.
· Where matters of policy are involved it is impossible to say that
there is a "right" and a "wrong." There is simply a "majority" and a
"minority." It is sufficient to observe, therefore, that the majority of
the Court in this formative period, interpreted the Congressional acts
of 1875 and 1887 in such a way as to refute any notion that either or
both of these acts were designed to bring every federal case into the
federal courts. The decision in every instance as to what constituted a
"federal question" remained precisely what it was in the Osborn case.
To vest jurisdiction the federal question had to appear in the original
pleading. After the Tennessee case this meant the plaintiff's complaint.
By·the terms of section 5 ot the act of 1875, jurisdiction would be
ousted if the necessary facts did not also appear in the subsequent pro50
See Meigs, "The Relief of the Supreme Court of the United States," 23 Au.
L. REG. (n.s.) 360 at 361 (1884).
51
24 Stat. L. 552 (1887); 25 Stat. L. 433 (1888).
52
152 U.S. 454, 14 S. Ct. 654 (1894).

1 9471

FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

39

ceedings of the case. These propositions were to be carried forward into
the succeeding and :final period of court interpretation. But with the
advance of time the policy of Congress in 1875 became less and less a
matter of active concern to the Court. There remained, therefore, only
a duty to enforce the act, regardless of the policy which occasioned it.
The natural presumption was that previous decisions embodied this
policy and that reliance upon precedent would perpetuate it. Whatever changes were to be made, therefore, had to be on the basis of selfinterest and trial convenience. Accordingly, the language to be found
in the early cases 'Yas faithfully repeated in the later ones; but out of
context it would be purely a matter of chance whether the effect of that
language in any given case would be the same as it had been originally.
As we move into the modern period of interpretation, therefore, we
sometimes :find a distorted reflection of the earlier periods, and it becomes important to distinguish between distortion which time alone has
brought about, and that which is the result of conscious change.

IV
THE MODERN PERIOD OF INTERPRETATION

The language of section 5 of the act of 1875, as interpreted by
Ch~ef Justice Waite in the Keyes case, :finds repeated expression in the
cases of the twentieth century. Yet taken out of context and out of historical perspective, selected passages could very well suggest something
altogether different from that which the Chief Justice had in mind. 5 s
We have already noted how some have interpreted the Waite opinion
to mean that the federal question must itself be the subject of controversy, and this has been the fate of similar language in later cases. But
a precise reading of the passages in question will reveal that most of
them provide only that a dispute or controversy must involve a right
which depends upon a construction of the Constitution or laws of the
United States. This distinction, tenuous though it may seem, makes the
158
In Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 191 U.S. 184 at 190, 191, 24 S. Ct. 63
(1903), we find this language quoted: " ••• when a suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to the effect or construction of the Constitution or laws of the United States, upon the determinaiton of which the result
depends, it is not a suit arising under the Constitution or laws. And it must appear on
the record, by a statement in legal and logical form, such as is required in good pleading, that the suit is one which does really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy as to a right which depends on the construction of the Constitution or some
law or treaty of the United States, before jurisdiction can be maintained on this
ground." The reader will immediately recognize this as a near quotation from the

Keyes case.
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whole difference between sense and nonsense. Chief Justice Marshall
had long ago declared that the controversy need not involve the federal question itself, and although in most instances it would, for purposes of Constitutional interpretation it must not be included as a requirement. Language which loosely embodies it, therefore, must be
read in light of other language which qualifies it.
Most of the passages which cause difficulty of this nature are concerned with conditions for the rhention of jurisdiction. They simply
advise that when certain conditions do not exist ( the same which are
necessary for vesting of jurisdiction) the court is not justified in ruling ·
that "jurisdiction can be maintained." From this some have argued
that if such conditions do exist at any time in the proceedings the court
is entitled to vest jurisdiction, notwithstanding that such jurisdiction
could not have vested previously. This, as Judge Amidon points out in
McGoon v. Northern Pacific Railway Company 55 is a non sequitur.
The language is never employed to justify the vesting of federal juris-diction, but only the O!}Sting or retention thereof. It is well settled that
the vesting of jurisdiction can take place only at the time of the original pleading. If the facts necessary for the vesting of jurisdiction do
not appear in ·the pleading, their appearance at any later stage in the
proceedings cannot vest jurisdiction in the federal courts, but can serve
only as the basis for appellate review.
·
In Gully v. First National Bank in Meridianfl 6 Justice Cardozo
brings together all of the various phraseology and arguments which
have appeared in the course of the long history of "federal question,"
and gives us a perfect picture of the current status of this subject.
Many have seen fit to criticize the opinion on the ground that it reflects
confusion-and indecision. 57 None, of course, can deny the excellence of
the writing. No other jurist in American history has delivered himself
with the clarity of thought and beauty of expression which habitually
characterized the opinions of Justice ~ardozo. The confusion in the
Gully case, I am satisfied, was not in the mind of the Justice, but rather
in the variegated reading which was bestowed upon it.
The Gully case is almost wholly a resume of the classical doctrines
of federal question jurisdiction. ::N\me of the rriore recent cases have
54,

114

See note 53, supra.
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added anything to this compendium, nor have they introduced any
modifications which are not to be found here. Justice Cardozo reviews
the history of the subject from the Osborn case down to 1936._ After
stating the usual propositions ( that the facts necessary for vesting jurisdiction must appear in the original pleading, and that they must reveal
a dispute or controversy as to a right which depends upon the construction of federal law), he goes on to explain the further developments which have taken place since the early statement. of the law.
As to the early period he notes that "if a federal right was pleaded, the
question was not always asked whether it was likely to be disputed." 118
It should be especially noted that he refers to the "right" being in dispute, and not to the federal question itself. This is a clear recognition
of the distinction which has been drawn throughout this work. Justice
Cardozo obviously had in mind what Congress had in mind when it
adopted section 5 of the act of 1875. Jurisdiction vested when an apparently bona fide federal claim appeared in the pleading. In the early
cases jurisdiction was retained even though the federal claim subsequently disappeared from the case. This was a matter to be remedied,
and Justice Cardozo observes that it was remedied in the later decisions.
He says, "partly under the influence of statutes disclosing a new legislative policy, partly under the influence of more liberal decisions, the
probable course of the trial, the real substance of the controversy, has
taken 'on a new significance." 69 He then quotes with approval from
Sluelthis v. McDougal; 60 but here again we have nothing more than
a paraphrase of the essential proposition in section 5, that jurisdiction
ought not to be retained if it appears that the right which is the subject
of controversy in the case cannot be sustained or defeated by a construction of federal law.
Having ~nnounced this proposition of section 5 as an integral part
of the modern law of federal question jurisdiction, Justice Cardozo
went on to discuss a modification of the law as it was developed in the
Osborn case. It will be remembered that the Osborn case itself depended upon the proposition that a federal question could appear
iss Gully-v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109 at

II3, 57 S. Ct. 96

(1936).
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Id. at 113, 114.
at I 14: "A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the
United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws,
for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends." Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 at 569,
32 S. Ct. 704 (1912).
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indirectly in the claim of right. This, of course, continues to be the law
to the present day. It remains the only justification for suits which
obtain federal jurisdiction solely on the basis of federal incorporation,
even as amended by the act of February 13, 1925.61 But the Justice
observes that a practical matter ~'the doctrine of the charter cases was
to be treated as exceptional, though within their special field there was
no thought to disturb them." 62 In other words, the Court would no
longer allow the ordinary plaintiff to present a federal question indirectly. It had to appear directly in the claim of right itself. Thus, although Rule 1 (b) above was not disturbed as a constitutional proposition, as a practical matter the courts would now apply Rule 1 (a) in all
except charter cases. This was evidenced in the facts of the Gully case
itself. There the claim of the plaintiff was for the collection of taxes
authorized by state statute. The defendant sought removal to the federal court on the ground that a federal question was involved, since the
right of the state to tax the shares of national banks was derived from a
federal statute. In short, before the state could collect its taxes it had
to show that it had the right to impose them under federal law. This
was similar to the situation in the Osborn case where the plaintiff had
to show that it had· the right to sue before it could press its claim. In
the Gully case Justice Cardozo did riot deny that the federal question
might, in fact, prove to be the· main issue in the case. But he pointed
out that the claim of right itself was a state claim. Although th! right
which the state conferred was itself derived from federal law this
would not influence th~ Court in its decision, since otherwise every
claim could ultimately be traced to some federal law or to the Constitution. As a practical matter, therefore, the proposition propounded by
Chief Justice Marshall was too· broad to serve as a guide in the mine
run of cases. As Justice Cardozo said, "If we follow the ascent far
enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have their source
or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the
Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions upon legislative
power." 118
The rules, therefore, .which Justice Cardozo announced in the
Gully case were those which had been laboriously developed through
the years; they modified the classical doctrine only to the extent required by practical considerations of trial convenience, and incorporated
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the proposition expressed in section 5 of the act of 1875. It should be
evident at once that the Court could not have announced the stand it
took in the Gully case unless it had repudiated the notion that the act
of 1875, which it was purportedly applying, had been designed to
bring every federal question case into the federal courts. If such had
been the design of the act, the Gully case might properly have been retained; but it was not. Clearly, the Court had satisfied itself that only
a certain class of federal question cases 'were intended to be tried
initially in the federal courts. These were the prejudiced cases. Although the Court of 1936 may not have had them in mind by name, in
following the lead of the earlier Courts which did, it gave effect to the
true policy of the act. The Court was justified in abandoning precedent
only where.it could limit the number of cases appearing in the federal
courts without destroying the basic propositions previously evolved.
This it did in refusing to follow Rule 1 (b) as a practical guide. But
this was no drastic departure from the underlying philosophy, and it is
significant that the Court refused to alter any of the essential elements
of federal question jurisdiction. Any other conclusion can be reached
only by a process of reading into the Court's language, which was
couched in terms of earlier decisions, a meaning other than that which
the earlier Courts intended.
The rash of suggestions which have advocated conscious revision in
this field, cannot be sustained in light of the historical conditions which
have brought the "federal question" to its present stage. A comment in
the Illinois Law RC'Uiew,64 for example, recommends legislative surgery for the Supreme Court. It proposes a change in the statute, which
would allow federal courts to take jurisdiction in a case which "involves
a substantial dispute, as determined from the pleadings, as to the con-.
struction of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 65
The result of this would be to restore the law as it was in ·1880
under the ruling of the Railroad case. It would permit the courts to
examine the defendant's answer as well as the plaintiff's complaint in
vesting federal jurisdiction. Under this proposed legislation the courts
might be required to accept a case like Louisville and Nashville R.R.
Co. v. Mottley, 66 which the Supreme Court, acting sua sponte, dismissed because the federal claim appeared in the plaintiff's complaint
only by way of anticipation of the defendant's defense. If the defendant actually made the anticipated defense in his pleading the federal
M
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, courts would have jurisdiction under the terms of the legislation proposed above. This same result is advocated by Messrs. Chadbourn and
Levin through therapeutic treatment by the Court itself. They say,
"The most significant holding of the Tennessee decision . . . was the
interpretation of the phraseology of Section 2 of the Act of 18 88 so as
to prevent removal to the federal courts of suits involving federal
question defenses. Thi~ holding, it is submitted, is indefensible on
policy grounds, as well as on the technicality ofstatutory construction
which is its cornerstone. For it is a short-sighted, parochial policy to
keep the federal dockets clear at the expense of cluttering state
dockets." 67 But when one considers that there are forty-eight state
court systems and only one federal court system, the policy seems
neither short-sighted nor parochial. It is entirely reasonable and proper
for the state courts to absorb their proportionate share of federal question cases, as they are presently doing. And it was undoubtedly this
consideration which played a large part in influencing the majority of
the Court. Justice Harlan~s dissent was, like Justice Johnson's dissent
in the Osborn case, perfectly logical when considered out of historical
perspective. But it was considered inappropriate in 1894, and I find
nothing in the history of 1947 which would justify a different conclusion.
Probably the type of case which troubles most observers is that
which is typified by The Fair v. Kohler Die and Specialty Co.68 In that
case a claim under patent law was set forth in the pleadings. As it was
stated, the claim could be sustained or defeated by an interpretation of,
the federal law. The facts which supported the claim were bona :fide;
that is, they represented truthfully as much of the situation as was
essential to the claim. But it was evident to everyone, including the
Supreme Court, that the ultimate determination of the cause would not
rest upon a construction of federal law. The pleadings, however, gave
jurisdiction to the federal court and the case was retained. It has been
argued apparently with reference to this type of situation, that "Marshall's text in the Osborn case should be resurrected. . . . Marshall's
criterion should be restored to determine of what cases there is initial
jurisdiction. However, to determine when that jurisdiction will be
exercised, Section 5 of the Act of l 87 5 should be applied." 69 This is
67
,
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precisely the rule which the Court has evolved. Marshall's criterion
was used in the Fair case to vest jurisdiction in the federal courts. Section 5 of the act o{ 187$ would have been used by the Court to oust
jurisdiction if the Court had really been-satisfied that the facts which
appeared in the pleading no longer existed in the case. But the facts
were present in the case; they simply were not the subject of contra- ·
versy. ·Section 5 was designed to oust jurisdiction where the subsequent
disappearance of the facts necessary for the vesting of jurisdiction indicated a lack of good faith. It was not designed, and, as one writer has
demonstrated, it has not been used,7° to dismiss cases where the facts
of the pleading are substantiated by a later examination of the facts by
the court. The change which is proposed, therefore, is no change at all,
since it is a current rule of the Court; and as applied, it does not have
the sweeping effect which is claimed for it. It could have this effect only
if section 5 be interpreted to authorize the dismissal of a suit whenever
the federal question itself is hot controverted in the trial. This, as we
have noted, would contradict one of Marshall's basic propositions, and
cannot be accepted as a valid statement of Congressional intent.
V
CONCLUSION

The language which is used in modern cases to define federal
question jurisdiction derives from classical sources. The Osborn case,
the Keyes case, and section 5 of the act of 1875 may each claim a measure of credit. The import of the language used today is essentially no
different from that which it carried at its inception. Modifications have
appeared, it is true, but these are minor variations to accord with current notions of trial convenience. They are in no way designed to alter
the underlying policies which are reflected in the early decisions. It
was the purpose and intent of Congress in 1875 to insure that every
federal question case likely to be prejudiced in a state court could find
a ready and impartial forum in the federal courts. This was assured by
the simple expedient of allowing the plaintiff to choose his forum on
the basis of his claim. Considerations of self-interest led the Supreme
Court to spare the federal dockets by preventing the defendant from
exercising the same right, although his right to remove on the basis of
the plaintiff's claim is preserved. The result of these policies has been

° Forrester, "Federal Question Jurisdiction and Section 5," 18
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to limit federal question jurisdiction beyond what is currently advocated by many text-writers. But nothing is to be gained by extending
that jurisdiction. Every federal question case today has an adequate
forum. If the federal claim appears in the plaintiff's complaint, jurisdiction of the case vests in the federal courts. If it continues to appear
throughout the proceedings it is retained in the f~deral courts. If it
does not appear in the pleadings, but appears in the course of the trial,
it serves as the basis for appeal from the state courts to the federal
courts. If it appears in the pleadings and does not appear subsequently,
it is remanded to the state courts. All of this presents a neat and logical
pattern. No suitor is prejudiced by the application of these criteria; yet
the policies of the Court and Congress are fully effectuated by them.
We can conclude only, therefore, that any further change, whether by
legislation or gratuitous interpretation, unaccompanied by a basic
change in policy, would defeat the historical and logical purpose of the
jurisdiction, and would amount to unjustifiable retrogression .
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